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I. INTRODUCTION
When determining a patent’s eligibility, the judiciary creates the same
effect as spinning the Wheel of Fortune1 in leaving behind an impenetrable,
and at best, cloudy means to the end, thus creating a sense of unpredictability
and eliminating hope for anything resembling consistency. The U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office’s (“PTO”) 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance (“2019
PEG”)2 does not fully resolve the befuddled remains of federal courts’
vigilant attempts to apply 35 U.S.C. § 1013 in patent-eligibility decisions.4
Conflicting guidance for eligibility leaves ambiguity in identifying subject
matter that constitutes an “improvement to the functioning of a computer or
to any other technology or technological field,” and disincentivizes
innovation due to unpredictable standards.5
This Comment discusses how considerations in federal court decisions
demonstrate discrepancies in the application of tests for patent eligibility.
1. Wheel of Fortune (Sony Pictures Studios television broadcast).
2. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 50

(Jan. 7, 2019) (setting forth a new standard for patent eligibility).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
4. See, e.g., Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 F. App’x
1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (highlighting the need for more consistent standards for
eligibility).
5. MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 24, Jan. 2018) § 2106.05(a).
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This Comment highlights the need for a consistent standard for patent
eligibility.6 Patent eligibility involves determining whether a claim is
directed toward a judicial exception (i.e., law of nature, natural phenomena,
or abstract idea) and whether the claim directed toward a judicial exception
fails to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.7 This
Comment focuses primarily on abstract ideas in discussing judicial
exceptions and patent eligibility.
Part II references eligibility standards under case law and the 2019 PEG.
Part III analyzes possible interpretations of improvements to technology
under conflicting standards and the implications of such tension. Part IV
argues that Congress must define a new standard for eligibility and
improvements to technology.8
II. THE STAIRWAY TO ELIGIBILITY UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
35 U.S.C. § 101 acts as a gatekeeper for patents.9 Following the
legislature’s definition of patent-eligible subject matter, the federal courts
contrived phrases such as “judicial exceptions” and “abstract ideas,” and
have significantly narrowed the realm of eligible subject matter in
incremental revelations.10 In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,11 the U.S.
Supreme Court discussed the inventions that claim processes and highlighted
that processes, in general, are appropriate subjects for consideration under
35 U.S.C. § 101.12 In particular, the Kewanee court noted that claims of a
6. See Cleveland Clinic Found., 760 F. App’x at 1020 (opining there is a need for
a more consistent standard in determining eligibility).
7. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50.
8. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)
(highlighting the dangers of monopolizing technology by granting patents to seekers who
merely describe technological objectives).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018); see also Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 217 (2014) (applying the “new and useful” portion of 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
determine patent eligibility); Landmark Patent Decisions in the US that Shaped Patent
Laws, GREYB, https://www.greyb.com/landmark-patent-decisions-us/ (last visited Apr.
6, 2020) (discussing the difficulty in overcoming eligibility rejections).
10. See David O. Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157, 243
(2016) (opining that the restrictions on eligibility will dissuade investors); see also H.
Jared Doster, The English Origins of the Judicial Exceptions to 35 U.S.C. § 101, AM.
BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publica
tions/landslide/2018-19/march-april/english-origins-judicial-exceptions-35-usc-section101/ (last visited June 14, 2020) (contending that judicial exceptions are concepts taken
by the U.S. Supreme Court from English common law).
11. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
12. Id. at 474–75 (suggesting that processes qualified as patentable subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
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statutory category sufficed for purposes of eligibility.13 However, this
understanding of the Kewanee court is a far cry from other U.S. Supreme
Court decisions, which restricted statutory subject matter within statutory
classes.14 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.15 notably narrowed
products that could be deemed eligible subject matter.16 Further, inventions
directed toward judicial exceptions do not constitute patent-eligible subject
matter under current federal court standards.17 That is, an invention, such as
a method for sending messages, does not constitute patent-eligible subject
matter in and of itself.18 Such methods merely applied to the internet setting
would not suffice for overcoming an abstract idea.19 Determinations of
whether an invention is directed toward a judicial exception derive from the
inclusion of “useful” in 35 U.S.C. § 101, the ambiguity of which has led to
years of dispute and discrepancy.20
a. Federal Courts’ Undefined Analysis of Abstract Ideas
Since the phrase “abstract idea” is undefined, the federal courts use
precedent for determining whether inventions are directed toward abstract
ideas.21 The federal courts currently follow a test set forth under Alice Corp.
13. Id. at 476–78 (discussing requirements for patentability, including claims of
statutory classes).
14. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972) (restricting the realm of
eligible process patents under reasoning from the Funk Bros. Court); Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978) (contending that claiming a specific purpose does not
necessarily save an ineligible process claim).
15. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
16. See id. at 132 (deciding that advantages of mixed inoculants were not sufficient
to accord with eligibility standards).
17. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)
(warning against monopolization of judicial exceptions by restricting the realm of
eligible subject matter).
18. See, e.g., Windy City Innovations, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 886,
898 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (finding that the claim is directed to the abstract idea of sending
and displaying a message).
19. See A Pty Ltd. v. eBay, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 739, 746 (W.D. Tex. 2016)
(determining that a patent for verifying email addresses was directed toward the abstract
idea of verifying destinations).
20. See generally William Gvoth, 2019 Has So Far Shown a Continued State of Flux
for 35 U.S.C. § 101, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS: GLOB. IP & TECH. L. BLOG (July 11, 2019),
https://www.iptechblog.com/2019/07/2019-has-so-far-shown-a-continued-state-of-fluxfor-section-35-u-s-c-%C2%A7101/ (describing a draft bill to reform 35 U.S.C. § 101 that
redefines “useful” and alters the process for judicial subject matter eligibility
determinations).
21. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(stating the Federal Circuit must compare challenged patents to precedent since the U.S.
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v. CLS Bank International22 and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc.23 (“Alice/Mayo test”) to determine whether inventions are
patent-eligible.24 The test begins with a determination as to whether the
claims recite a statutory category (“Step 1”) (i.e., machine, method, system,
or composition of matter).25 If the claims recite a statutory category, courts
then determine whether the claims are directed toward a judicial exception
(“Step 2A”).26 If the claims are directed toward a judicial exception, courts
determine whether the claims offer significantly more than the judicial
exception, thus reciting an inventive concept (“Step 2B”).27 An inventive
concept may be found from the unconventional arrangement or activities of
elements (i.e., structural components such as computers or sensors).28
i. The Birth of Business Method Patents
Gottschalk v. Benson29 further defines patent eligibility from the standard
set forth by Congress under 35 U.S.C. § 101, contending that a process
qualifies for consideration if it: (1) is implemented by a particular machine
in a non-conventional and non-trivial manner; or (2) transforms an article
from one state to another.30 In Gottschalk, the Court invalidated a patent for
programming a generic computer to convert signals from binary-coded
decimal form into pure binary form.31 The Gottschalk court did not discuss
the merits of business method inventions; however, the Court’s finding that
the computerized method amounted to ineligible subject matter narrowed the

Supreme Court has yet to define an abstract idea).
22. 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
23. 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
24. See, e.g., Netflix, Inc. v. Rovi Corp., 114 F. Supp. 3d 927, 951 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(applying the Alice/Mayo test and finding that the claim limitations failed to disclose an
inventive concept), aff’d, 670 F. App’x 704 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
25. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216 (stating the statutory categories of “process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” and contending that a claim must first
fall in a statutory category to be considered for patentability).
26. See id. (instructing courts to determine whether a claim to a statutory class is
directed to a patent-ineligible concept).
27. See Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (finding that the unconventional arrangement of sensors amounted to significantly
more than the abstract idea of determining positions).
28. Id. at 1348.
29. 409 U.S. 63 (1972), rev’g, 441 F.2d 682 (1971).
30. See id. at 69–70 (finding that a practice is not ineligible if there exists a particular
machine or a transformation).
31. Id. at 71–72.
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chances of eligibility for business method patents.32 Here, the Gottschalk
court decided that the challenged claims were directed toward an algorithm
applied to a computer, and thus, were not limited to any type of machinery
or a transformation of substance, and if patented, would preempt the use of
the mathematical formula.33
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.34 is the
first milestone case regarding the patentability of business method patents.35
Prior to State Street Bank, the PTO rejected business method patents as
claiming abstract ideas.36 The State Street Bank court allowed business
method patent inventions to be treated the same as any other patent invention
in finding that the eligibility test should be directed toward a “useful,
concrete, and tangible result” test rather than a “business versus technology”
test.37 As such, the patent challenged in State Street Bank amounted to
eligible subject matter, regardless of its categorization under business
methods.38 In 2010, Bilksi v. Kappos39 rendered the “machine-ortransformation” test set forth in Gottschalk inadequate as the primary test for
patentability, thereby restricting the realm of eligibility.40

32. See Kristian Sullivan, A Work in Progress: The Ever [or Never] Changing Role
of the Machine-or-Transformation Test in Determinations of Patentable Subject Matter
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, 12 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 362, 384 (2012) (contending that
business method patents must reflect the machine-or-transformation test along with other
U.S. Supreme Court considerations to qualify for potential patent eligibility).
33. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71–72 (finding that use of a computer was not
necessitated, and the invention’s patent would amount to a patent on the formula itself).
34. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
35. Id. at 1373, 1375 (opening the realm of eligibility to business method patents).
36. See id. at 1375, 1377 (drawing upon the “useful” language of patent law to
determine that business method patents are not non-statutory); see also AT&T Corp. v.
Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming the finding that
business method patents are not in and of themselves non-statutory), abrogated by In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
37. Ebby Abraham, Bilski v. Kappos: Sideline Analysis from the First Inning of
Play, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 33 (2011) (contending that the State Street Bank court
rejected the business method exception to patentability in finding that business method
inventions may be patentable).
38. State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1377 (finding that the patent for managing mutual
fund investment structure amounted to eligible subject matter).
39. 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (determining that a particular machine or transformation is
not in and of itself an eligibility test).
40. Id. at 603–04; see also Abraham, supra note 37, at 41–42 (contending that the
Bilski court denounced the business method exception for patentability).
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ii. The Alice/Mayo Effect on Business Method Patents
In 2014, examiners reopened several business method patents and
determined that inventions should be rendered ineligible in light of Alice.41
The Alice court primarily relied on the decision in Mayo to restrict eligible
subject matter to the furthest point in the history of business method
patents.42
The Alice/Mayo test was adopted by federal courts and implemented in the
PTO. 43 Examiners relied on the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(“MPEP”) and case law for determinations of eligibility under the
Alice/Mayo test, whereas courts are bound by federal precedent.44 In
determining what the pending claim is “directed to” under the second step of
the Alice/Mayo test, Step 2A, examiners and courts often found that claims
could be simplified to abstract ideas such as “determining,” “comparing,”
“generating,” etc.45 Less subject matter than ever before is eligible under
Alice, and therefore, patent seekers and holders in business methods
negatively received the test.46

41. See Jasper L. Tran, Two Years After Alice v. CLS Bank, 98 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 354, 358 (2016) (disclosing an invalidation rate of
approximately sixty-six percent as of June 2016 following the Alice court’s decision).
42. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 87–88
(2012) (outlining considerations in eligibility that further restricted the realm of eligible
subject matter).
43. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18, 221 (2014)
(outlining the Alice/Mayo test); Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 73 (finding that
mere application of a system or method on generic computing components is not
sufficient to overcome the abstraction); see also MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 24, Jan. 2018) §
2106.05(a).
44. See Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 F. App’x
1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (declining to follow PTO guidelines in light of U.S. Supreme
Court precedent).
45. See Christian Dorman, “One If by Land, Two If by Sea”: The Federal Circuit’s
Oversimplification of Computer-Implemented Mathematical Algorithms, 2018 U. ILL.
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 285, 292–93 (2018) (finding that the simplification of claims to
abstract gerunds regardless of computer components leads to higher rates of
invalidation); Rebecca Lindhorst, Note, Two-Stepping Through Alice’s Wasteland of
Patent-Eligible Subject Matter: Why the Supreme Court Should Replace the Mayo/Alice
Test, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 762 (2019) (“The test fails to provide objective
guidelines and leaves the patent-eligibility determination to the subjective opinion of a
judge or patent examiner.”).
46. See Hallie Wimberly, Comment, The Changing Landscape of Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility and Its Impact on Biotechnological Innovation, 54 HOUSTON L. REV.
995, 1008 (2017) (referencing the restrictions on patent eligibility).
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iii. “New” Take on Identifying Abstract Ideas
Prior to the implementation of the 2019 PEG, the courts and the PTO
rejected and invalidated patents in tandem.47 However, the PTO’s
implementation of the 2019 PEG divorced the PTO from federal courts and
their adherence to the Alice/Mayo test.48
The 2019 PEG is based on the Alice/Mayo test to determine patent
eligibility, but it altered the step for determining whether a claim of an
invention is directed toward a judicial exception.49 In particular, the 2019
PEG now advises two parts to Step 2A.50 That is, instead of determining
whether the claims are “directed to” an abstract idea as in the Alice/Mayo
test, examiners under the 2019 PEG now determine whether the claim recites
an abstract idea under the first part of Step 2A of the eligibility test (“Step2A
Prong 1”).51 Examiners then determine whether the claim integrates the
abstract idea into a practical application under the second part of Step 2A of
the eligibility test (“Step 2A Prong 2”).52
The 2019 PEG offers a series of considerations for determining whether
an invention is eligible and highlights a practical application of an abstract
idea in rendering inventions patent-eligible.53 The analysis of the practical
application represents a more streamlined and consistent determination of

47. See Chad J. Hammerlind, Patent Eligibility Used as the Federal Circuit’s
Shuttlecock in Weekly Badminton Match, 31 No. 6 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 8, 8
(explaining that examiners are rendering more cases eligible under the 2019 PEG but
that this change is separating the PTO from federal courts).
48. See Russell Slifer, The Federal Circuit Just ‘Swallowed All of Patent Law’ in
ChargePoint v. SemaConnect, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.
com/2019/04/02/federal-circuit-just-swallowed-patent-law-chargepoint-v-sema
connect/id=107917/ (contending that a patent may be issued under the 2019 PEG but
will be out of line with the courts); see, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Applying Patent-Eligible
Subject Matter Restrictions, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 267, 279–86 (2015)
(highlighting alternative tests based on a host of other concerns).
49. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (relying on the Alice/Mayo rationale).
50. Id. at 53–54.
51. See id. at 54 (advising that the purpose of the new guidance is to streamline the
eligibility analysis and finding that the “directed to” consideration under Alice/Mayo is
inefficient and subjective).
52. See id. (defining that a practical application exists where there is, inter alia,
improvement to other technology or technological field, improvement to computer
functionality, and a meaningful limitation); see also Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG
LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding an improvement to interface
technology).
53. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54–55 (instructing examiners to follow a series of steps in determining eligibility).
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eligibility under the 2019 PEG.54
b. Improvements to Technology Under the Standards in Play
Although the federal courts have yet to address the merits of the 2019
PEG, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware did suggest that the
2019 PEG can deliver different outcomes than the Alice/Mayo test.55 The
PTO set forth examples to accompany the 2019 PEG to clarify subject matter
eligibility and the District Court of Delaware acknowledged a discrepancy
between one example under the 2019 PEG and federal court standards.56
Example 40 of the 2019 PEG discloses adaptive monitoring of network
traffic data and is a practical application of the judicial exception because the
claims present an improvement to network monitoring.57 Therefore,
Example 40 constitutes patent-eligible subject matter.58 Conversely, the
district court in Citrix Systems, Inc. v. Avi Networks, Inc.59 found similar
claims to be ineligible under the Alice/Mayo test for failing to recite
significantly more than a complex abstraction using conventional computing
components.60 In acknowledging the similarity of the challenged claims to
those of Example 40, the district court did not attempt to rectify the different
outcomes, but rather concluded that the courts were bound by the Alice/Mayo
test over the 2019 PEG.61 Successful prosecution at the PTO may be short-

54. See id. (instructing examiners to replace the “directed to” determination of the
Alice/Mayo test and the comparison of claims to case law with two prongs for
determining whether the claim recites abstract ideas, and if so, whether the claim
integrates the abstract idea into a practical application).
55. See Citrix Sys., Inc. v. Avi Networks, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 3d 511, 525 n.2 (D. Del.
2019) (acknowledging that the claims invalidated by the present court are similar to
Example 40 of the 2019 PEG representing patent-eligible subject matter).
56. See id. (noting the divide between the PTO examples and the decision of the
District Court of Delaware). See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY EXAMPLES: ABSTRACT IDEAS (2019) (disclosing eligible
and ineligible examples, numbered 37–42, of patent claims).
57. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 56, at 10–11 (determining
under the 2019 PEG that the claim recited the statutory category of a process under Step
1, recited the judicial exception of a mental process under Step 2A Prong 1, and
integrated the judicial exception into a practical application under Step 2A Prong 2).
58. Id.
59. Citrix Sys., Inc., 363 F. Supp. 3d at 511.
60. Id. at 522 (finding the claims were directed toward an abstract idea and merely
recited conventional computer activity under the Alice/Mayo test).
61. See id. at 521, 525 n.2 (suggesting that the two standards for eligibility deliver
different outcomes in acknowledging the similarities between Example 40 and the
challenged claims).

290

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9:2

lived as the federal courts give no deference to PTO eligibility standards.62
i. Improvement to Technology Under Federal Case Law
Courts apply the “improvement” portion of the test by asking whether a
technological solution to a technological problem exists.63
When
determining whether an improvement exists, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit analyzes whether the invention itself aims to improve
computer functionality or an existing technological field.64 That is, claims
may be patent-eligible in part due to the purported disclosure denoting
benefits over prior art inventions.65 However, Ultramercial v. Hulu66
highlights the importance of claim language, thus reminding the patent
community that any supposed benefits must further be embodied in the
claims.67
Alice establishes that merely employing a computer to effect some process
or improvement is insufficient to render an invention patent-eligible.68 The
invention must satisfy the “harnessing” principle and effect a concrete
application of the abstract idea.69
In distinguishing determined
62. See Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 F. App’x
1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (invalidating claims for being ineligible and declining to
follow PTO guidelines in labeling similar subject matter eligible).
63. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
64. See IBM Corp. v. Groupon, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 596, 605–06 (D. Del. 2017)
(distinguishing challenged claims from those of Two-Way Media v. Comcast Cable
Communications, 874 F.3d 1329, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 2017), in finding that the
challenged claims described the specific architecture behind the claimed computer
improvement).
65. See, e.g., Two-Way Media, 874 F.3d at 1338 (determining that the claims were
invalid for missing the inventive concept of technological innovations recited in the
specification).
66. 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
67. See id. at 715 (“We must examine the limitations of the claims to determine
whether the claims contain an ‘inventive concept’ to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract
idea into patent-eligible subject matter.”); see also Voip-Pal.Com, Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,
375 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (finding arguments to improvement
irrelevant since the “purported improvements have not been captured in the claim”).
68. See generally Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014)
(finding that while “all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,” the claims must still pose significantly
more than a monopolization of such concepts); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig.,
823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (suggesting that disclosure of generic technologies in a
nascent environment is insufficient to specify an improvement to technology).
69. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1299, 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the abstract idea was harnessed in the animation field
in a particular manner to claim an unknown benefit to the field).
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improvements that harness abstract principles from concepts that invoke the
use of a computer to achieve a result, case law advises that eligible inventions
may specify ways in which a computer assists in the improvement of the
technology.70
Diamond v. Diehr71 is a milestone case for demonstrating when a
computerized method offers an improvement to an existing technology.72
The invention in this case improved a technological field because it
overcame a common technological problem in rubber molding processes.73
Similarly, the invention in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.74 is an
improvement to computer functionality in claiming a specific data structure
for storing and retrieving data and offers relevant considerations in
discerning improvements to technology, such as identifying the focus of the
claim as a whole.75 In particular, federal courts suggest that improvements
to a technological tool pose improvements to technology.76
In Finjan Inc. v. Blue Coast Systems, Inc.,77 Blue Coast Systems
challenged the eligibility of Finjan’s patent for virus scanning and detection
of previously unknown viruses. The Finjan court held that the challenged
claims posed an improvement to technology because previous virusscanning practices only recognized previously-identified viruses.78 In
particular, the invention in Finjan offered a technological solution to a
70. See DDR Holdings, LLC. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1259 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (noting that the improved and particular method of data collection constituted an
improvement to technology); see also Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DirecTV, LLC, 838
F.3d 1253, 1256–57 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that an advance in the process for
downloading content for streaming purposes constitutes an improvement to technology).
71. 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (finding a new combination of steps to be patentable as an
improvement in rubber molding technology even though all constituents of the
combination were well known and in common use before the combination was made).
72. See id. at 188–89 (highlighting that the existence of conventional components
does not bar eligibility).
73. Id. at 192–93 (contending that implementing mathematical formulas in a
structure in which the patent laws purport to protect the claim may constitute eligibility).
74. 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
75. See id. at 1335 (concluding that the unconventional database drove the
improvement to computer functionality).
76. See A Pty Ltd. v. eBay, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 739, 746 (W.D. Tex. 2016)
(distinguishing between solving a problem in technology and implementing commercial
practices in technology).
77. 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
78. Id. at 1304; see Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Deputy Comm’r for Patent
Examination Policy, to Patent Examining Corps 1 (Apr. 2, 2018) [hereinafter PTO Finjan
Memorandum] (establishing recent decisions indicating improvements to computer
functionality and improvements to technology under Alice/Mayo).
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problem that was not previously seen in the technological field.79 Similarly,
the Federal Circuit in Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics,
Inc.80 found that claims of a graphical user interface for mobile devices
displaying a summary window of each application while in an unlaunched
state posed improvements to interfaces for devices.81 Instead of using
conventional components to display a generic index, the claims are directed
toward a specific manner of displaying a limited set of information on a
mobile device.82
ii. Improvement to Technology Under the 2019 PEG
When determining if a practical application exists in the invention, the
2019 PEG instructs examiners to determine whether “an additional element
reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement
to other technology or technological field . . . .”83 The “improvement to
other technology or technological field” portion of the 2019 PEG sits among
other considerations for determining whether there is a practical application
and cites the MPEP and federal case law as support for asserted
improvements.84 There is still a question as to how an improvement to
technology or technological field is recognized and defined.85 Federal
precedent provides examples against which examiners and attorneys may
compare pending claims in determining whether improvements to
technology or computer-functionality exist, but this practice leaves ample
room for subjectivity in predicting eligibility.86
79. See Finjan, Inc., 879 F.3d at 1304 (finding that the invention amounted to
significantly more than conventional approaches to virus scanning).
80. 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
81. Id. at 1363 (concluding benefits to user interfaces over the prior art).
82. Id.
83. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 55
(Jan. 7, 2019).
84. See id.; DDR Holdings, LLC. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1265–66 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (finding that the display of the webpage design technology was an
improvement to webpage designs); Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L., 880 F.3d at 1363
(applying the Alice/Mayo test to determine that a graphical user interface posed
technological improvements to conventional interfaces); Finjan, Inc., 879 F.3d at 1304
(finding that there did exist an improvement in analyzing a downloadable code).
85. See MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 24, Jan. 2018) § 2106.05(a) (establishing considerations
for determining improvements to technology while failing to disclose an explicit standard
for such determinations).
86. Compare McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1315–
16 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining that automatic lip synchronization and facial expression
animation using computer-implemented rules were an improvement to computer
animation), and DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1259 (finding that an improved, particular
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iii. Inconsistencies within Federal Courts
TNS Media Research, LLC v. Tivo Research & Analytics, Inc.,87
exemplifies the discrepancy in determining whether there exists an
improvement to an existing technology.88 The invention in this dispute
involved a method for measuring the effectiveness of advertising in a
fragmented digital environment.89 A U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted summary judgment on the issue of patent
eligibility and determined that the patents were directed to ineligible subject
matter under the Alice/Mayo test.90 The court determined that the claims did
not necessitate a tangible machine for collecting data and the claims lacked
an inventive concept.91 Further, the alleged benefits disclosed in the
specification were not claimed, and thus, unclaimed disclosures could not
render claims patent-eligible.92
TNS Media Research was reassigned to another district court in the
Southern District of New York that used the same Alice/Mayo test to vacate
the summary judgment.93 The vacating court found that the claims in
question did in fact require a computer and that the invention reflected in the
claims purported improvements in data granulation.94 The court analyzed
the claims under Step 1 of the Alice/Mayo test and highlighted that the U.S.
Supreme Court has not established a definitive rule for determining what
subject matter constitutes an abstract idea.95 The court further determined
method of digital data compression may constitute an improvement to technology), with
Alice Corp. Party Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 221 (2014) (deducing that a
novel and non-obvious mental concept applied to a generic computer does not amount to
an improvement in technology).
87. 223 F. Supp. 3d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
88. TNS Media Research, LLC v. Tivo Research & Analytics, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 3d
432 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), vacated, 223 F. Supp. 3d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); see TNS Media
Research, LLC v. Tivo Research & Analytics, Inc., 629 F. App’x 916, 942 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (remanding the case back to the district court where eligibility matters were
discussed).
89. TNS Media Research, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 181.
90. See TNS Media Research, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 449–50 (concluding that the claims
did not pose significantly more than the abstract idea).
91. Id. (finding that the claims could be performed by a human without a computer
and did not purport to improve technology under the Alice/Mayo test).
92. Id.
93. TNS Media Research, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 171 (vacating the decision in 166 F.
Supp. 3d 432).
94. Id. at 176–77, 182 (discussing the need for a computer and the granular character
of the steps that allowed for improvements in data collection).
95. Id. at 178 (deciding that the Federal Circuit instead compares instant claims to
those previously analyzed by the Federal Circuit in precedent cases).
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that the vacated decision relied upon an overgeneralization of the claims to
reduce the invention to nothing more than abstract concepts and failed to
consider the components integrating the abstract concepts.96 Namely, the
reduction of the claims by the previous court to collecting, viewing, and
purchasing of data could describe a plurality of eligible and ineligible
inventions alike.97 The dispute in TNS Media Research represented the
vulnerability that inventions of methods purporting to improve technology
face in eligibility standards.98 The court decided that the claims are eligible
as having solved a technological problem but failed to resolve the ambiguity
among courts in coming to this conclusion.99
Similarly, district courts in the Northern District of California disagree on
inventions that constitute an improvement to technology. The court in
Immersion Corp. v. Fitbit, Inc.,100 in upholding a patent for haptic feedback
in wearable devices, disagreed with the decision in Fitbit, Inc. v.
AliphCom.101 In particular, this disagreement highlighted considerations of
how an unconventional arrangement of technological tools may affect
determinations of improvements to technology and whether inventions of
methods are less likely to pose improvements to technology than inventions
of other statutory classes.102 Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States103 touches
the matter and exemplifies how an unconventional arrangement of sensors
can pose improvements to the positioning of objects on a moving platform.104
Here, a method claim was deemed an improvement to technology since the
unconventional nature of the technology rendered an improvement to the

96. See id. at 181–82 (contending that an invention must harness such principles in
a meaningful composition).
97. See id. at 182 (highlighting that “virtually any invention can be reduced to a
concept,” but the question is whether the invention offers significantly more than just an
abstract concept).
98. See id. (expressing that method claims are especially vulnerable to
overgeneralization).
99. See id. (asserting the invention passes step two of the Alice/Mayo test by
resolving various technological problems but leaving open the improvement in
technology question).
100. 313 F. Supp. 3d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
101. See Fitbit, Inc. v. AliphCom, No. 16-cv-00118-BLF, 2017 WL 819235, at *10
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2017) (finding that the method for activity monitoring failed to pose
an improvement to a technological tool in the field of data monitoring).
102. See Immersion Corp., 313 F. Supp. 3d at 1025–26 (citing Thales Visionix, Inc.
v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
103. 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
104. Id. at 1348.
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technological field.105
Considerations of effects of unconventional arrangement of technological
tools are further explored in Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC106 and Mortgage Grader v. First Choice Loan Services Inc.107
In Bascom, the Federal Circuit upheld a patent for internet filtering using
generic computer tools.108 Conversely, the Federal Circuit in Mortgage
Grader invalidated a patent for evaluating loans using generic computer
tools.109
c. Sympathy for the Applicant
In Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics,110 the Federal
Circuit declined to follow the 2019 PEG, stating that it is not bound by the
instructions set forth therein.111 The Cleveland court also highlighted a need
for consistent application of case law.112 As such, patent eligibility is
unpredictable because there are two different standards that are being
applied.113 Applicants are expected to file patent applications under PTO
regulations, and thus, must prosecute patents under the 2019 PEG for the
purpose of eligibility.114 However, if the PTO grants a patent for the
application and a litigant challenges the application in federal court, the court
will refer to the prosecution history in part to determine validity.115 As the
federal courts make eligibility determinations under Alice/Mayo, applicants
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 1343.
827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
811 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1350 (conveying that the specific
method of filtering internet content was not conventional).
109. Mortg. Grader, Inc., 811 F.3d at 1322 (determining that the claims merely added
a computer to conventional steps).
110. 760 F. App’x 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
111. Id. at 1019–20.
112. Id.
113. See generally Alexander T. Katsulis et al., USPTO Clarifies Alice/Mayo Step 2A
With New Patent Subject-Matter Eligibility Guidance, K&L GATES (Jan. 10, 2019),
http://www.klgates.com/uspto-clarifies-alicemayo-step-2a-with-new-patent-subjectmatter-eligibility-guidance-01-10-2019/?nomobile=perm (stating that courts do not
follow the standard set forth by the PTO).
114. See James J. DeCarlo & George David Zalepa, The USPTO’s New Section 101
Guidance: Progress or Pitfall?, N.J.L.J. (May 10, 2019, 10:30 AM), https://www.law.
com/njlawjournal/2019/05/10/the-usptos-new-§101-guidance-progress-or-pitfall/
?slreturn=20190726013851 (instructing applicants to prosecute under the 2019 PEG
while being mindful of potential arguments under Alice/Mayo).
115. E.g., Cleveland Clinic Found., 760 F. App’x at 1019 (rejecting arguments under
the 2019 PEG at the federal district court).
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are likely to be at a disadvantage because they will need to have
supplemented the prosecution record with arguments under Alice/Mayo.116
Applicants may further find eligibility successes at the PTO short-lived as
the federal courts still apply a stricter standard.117
If applicants are unable to file under predictable standards, the patent
system may see a decrease in filings as applicants search for other means of
protection.118 Patents and trade secrets have historically overlapped in
statutory subject matter, and businesses may seek more predictability in an
area of intellectual property.119
III. CONFLICTING ELIGIBILITY PRECEDENT HAS MANGLED APPLICATIONS
OF STANDARDS AMONG THE COURTS AND PTO
Prior to the PTO’s implementation of the 2019 PEG, the federal courts and
the PTO uniformly rejected patents as ineligible under the same mangled
realm of patent law.120 While the 2019 PEG draws upon the same precedent
as used previously, its separation of considerations has generated a gap
between federal court decisions and PTO practices.121 This gap leads to
conflicting opinions in identifying improvements to technology and creates
uncertainty for the patent community.
a. Redefining Standards for Improvements to Technology
An improvement to technology should be defined as an unconventional
change to a technological tool that actuates a particular technological
solution to a particular technological problem, wherein precise instructions
for achieving the improvement are embodied in the claims.122 The foregoing
116. See DeCarlo & Zalepa, supra note 114 (suggesting that applicants must prepare
for various arguments).
117. See id. (finding discrepancies between Alice/Mayo and the 2019 PEG).
118. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 471 (1974) (“The risk of
eventual patent invalidity by the courts and the costs associated with that risk may well
impel some with a good-faith doubt as to patentability not to take the trouble to seek to
obtain and defend patent protection for their discoveries, regardless of the existence of
trade secret protection.”).
119. See id. (opining there is overlap across categories of intellectual property
protection and that trade secret protection may produce more efficient rewards).
120. See Hammerlind, supra note 47 (discussing the growing split between the PTO
and federal courts due to the implementation of the 2019 PEG).
121. See Slifer, supra note 48 (arguing that the Federal Circuit overruled the 2019
PEG).
122. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(highlighting the unconventional change as bolstering the determination of an improved
database); see also Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014)
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elements for this proposed standard are as follows: (1) technological art; (2)
unconventional change to a technological tool; and (3) a technological
solution with precise limitations for resolving a technological problem.
i. Technological Art
In compiling the plethora of case law regarding improvements to
technology, the underlying consideration is the identification of a
technological art.123 In re Benson defined technological arts in finding that
computers, regardless of their use, are within the realm of technological
arts.124 Although the decision for patentability in In re Benson was reversed
by Gottschalk, the standard for defining technological arts was not
referenced.125
However, federal courts have referenced computing
components when discussing improvements to technology or computer
functionality.126 As such, the standard for technological arts is arguably a
calculating component (i.e., a generic computing component such as a
processor or memory) or a combination of calculating components in
communication.127 That is, a technological tool present in the claims satisfies
a first step toward finding an improvement to technology.128 However, the
existence of a technological art is insufficient to render the claims an
improvement if the technological tool is merely performing a conventional
(distinguishing between changes in technology and novel abstractions); In re TLI
Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 612 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that generic
technology in the nascent environment is not sufficient for specifying a particular
solution).
123. See Bridge & Post, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 778 F. App’x 882, 889 (Fed.
Cir. 2019) (highlighting improvements to technology as, inter alia, inventing HTTP
header fields, user identifiers, or encryption techniques).
124. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (1971) (“It seems beyond question that the
machines — the computers — are in the technological field, are a part of one of our bestknown technologies, and are in the ‘useful arts’ rather than the ‘liberal arts,’ as are all
other types of ‘business machines,’ regardless of the uses to which their users may put
them.”); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 173, 200–01 (1981) (citing In re Benson, 441 F.2d
682 (1971)) (stating that the invention must do more than merely use a technological art).
125. See Diamond, 450 U.S. at 201 (contending that the standard set forth in In re
Benson has not been overturned).
126. See Enfish, LLC, 822 F.3d at 1335 (highlighting improvements to technological
arts, such as an LED display and chip architecture, and contending that the
unconventional database was an improvement to a technology that led to the
improvement of computer functionality).
127. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1328 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (suggesting that the database is the technological art to be improved).
128. See Fitbit, Inc. v. AliphCom, No. 16-CV-00118-BLF, 2017 WL 819235, at *10
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2017) (arguing that improvements must be made to a technological
tool).
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activity.129
ii. Unconventional Change to a Technological Tool
Alice distinguished between merely applying concepts to the computing
field and activating a change to the computing field or to a technology
itself.130 That is, the Alice court found that the mere existence of computing
devices in the invention was insufficient to render the claims an
improvement because the computing devices were paired with novel and
non-obvious abstract concepts.131 Conversely, the Federal Circuit in Enfish
found an improvement to technology in claims directed toward a selfreferential database.132 In that case, the court distinguished the challenged
claims from those deemed ineligible in Alice by finding that the challenged
claims are directed toward a database that functions differently than other
database structures and that the change generated benefits to the
technology.133
Federal courts, while not explicitly conflating the “conventional” analysis
with the “improvement” analysis, deduce improvements in part from
determinations of unconventional activity.134 Essentially, federal courts
have generally found that claims to an invention do not amount to an
improvement to a technology or technological field when the claims merely
employ generic computer implementation in a conventional or known

129. See TS Patents LLC v. Yahoo!, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 3d 968, 986 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(rejecting the instant claims as improvements to technology because the claims failed to
specify improvements to “folder” or “data object” storage itself), aff’d, 731 F. App’x 978
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
130. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(finding that a hardware component failed to transform the instant claims to patenteligible subject matter because asserted improvements were not to a technology but
rather were applied to a technological field).
131. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 304–05 (2014)
(distinguishing between an improved concept merely applied to technology and an
improvement to technology itself); see also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an
abstract idea.”).
132. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(finding that the claims set forth precise instructions for achieving a change from
conventional databases that led to increased flexibility, faster search times, and smaller
memory requirements).
133. Id. at 1338 (contrasting the generic computer components of Alice).
134. Id. at 1337 (“[O]ur conclusion . . . [of] an improvement . . . is bolstered . . . [and]
achieves other benefits over conventional databases . . . .”); OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (contending that conventional
computer activities do not constitute an improvement).
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manner.135 Mortgage Grader exemplifies the considerations of conventional
versus unconventional elements in finding that merely reciting generic
computers performing known functions does not make an otherwise
ineligible invention patent-eligible.136 Rather, the claims must effect an
improvement to the functioning of a computer itself or an improvement to
any other technology or technological field in order to be patent-eligible.137
There must be an unconventional change within a technological tool to effect
an improvement over what is currently known in industry.138 Bascom further
considers this notion in finding that a solution requiring “generic”
components may still be patent-eligible when operating in a nonconventional manner to achieve and improve an advancement over the prior
art.139
The Federal Circuit in Mortgage Grader and Bascom arrived at different
conclusions of eligibility with respect to the challenged claims of each
case.140 There is a substantial difference between the “generic elements” of
Bascom and those of Mortgage Grader.141
The “unconventional”
135. See TNS Media Research LLC v. Tivo Research & Analytics, Inc., 223 F. Supp.
3d 168, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that conventional activity may constitute failure to
effect an improvement), vacating 166 F. Supp. 3d 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); see, e.g., Versata
Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding no
unconventional software in achieving the alleged solution); Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that a
departure from conventional sequences may be indicative of improvements).
136. Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs., Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26).
137. Id. (finding that the claims were directed to the business idea of anonymous loan
shopping and did not purport to improve a computer or technology).
138. Compare CardioNet, LLC v. Scottcare Corp., 388 F. Supp. 3d 442, 459 (E.D.
Pa. 2019) (determining that the claims employ conventional technology, and thus, did
not amount to an improvement), with Enfish, LLC, 822 F.3d at 1330 (finding an
unconventional change to a self-referential table leading to improvements in the
database).
139. Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341,
1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (setting forth the standard that the mere existence of generic
computer components does not bar patentability); see Citrix Sys., Inc. v. Avi Networks,
Inc., 363 F. Supp. 3d 511, 516, 522 (D. Del. 2019) (searching for an unconventional
arrangement of technological elements).
140. Compare Mortg. Grader, Inc., 811 F.3d at 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (concluding
that the claims are directed to an abstract idea and fail to provide an inventive concept),
with Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1352 (concluding that the claims are
directed to an abstract idea but do provide an inventive concept in the ordered
combination of claim limitations).
141. Compare Mortg. Grader, Inc., 811 F.3d at 1324–25 (finding that the claims
merely add an interface, a network, and a database and do not purport to improve any
technology), with Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1350–51 (finding that
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arrangement of elements differentiates an ineligible claim employing generic
computer components from an eligible claim employing generic computer
components.142
iii. Technological Solution to a Technological Problem
After identifying whether an unconventional change to a technological art
exists, the next step is to determine whether there is a technological problem
to be improved.143 In particular, A Pty Ltd. v. eBay144 establishes that
addressing a long-standing problem in a computer setting is not sufficient in
itself to constitute a problem to be improved.145 For business method
purposes, merely addressing a long-standing business practice in a
conventional technolgical environment may equate to merely applying a
mental concept to a known computing field.146 Such practices do not
constitute actuating a change to a technological tool to purport technological
benefits.
If technological problems necessitating improvements exist, then there
must be a particular solution in determining improvements to technology or
another technological field.147 Such solutions could emulate those seen in
Enfish or DDR Holdings, where the improvements to technology led to

the ordered combination of limitations presented an improvement to filtering content).
142. See Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1350 (highlighting the test
for whether there exists an unconventional arrangement of elements for Step 2B of the
Alice/Mayo test).
143. See TNS Media Research LLC v. Tivo Research & Analytics, Inc., 223 F. Supp.
3d 168, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that the invention was an improvement to the
granulation of data and was indeed patent-eligible over the current state of the technology
for the data gathering); Citrix Sys., Inc., 363 F. Supp. 3d at 522 (searching for a problem
specifically arising in a technological field).
144. 149 F. Supp. 3d 739 (W.D. Tex. 2016).
145. See id. at 746 (highlighting that there must exist specificity in identifying a
technological problem and solution such that the claims must not merely purport to claim
a technological objective); see also id. at 743 (finding that asserted improvements must
be specific in the claim language); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (concluding that the instant claims failed to improve the advertising
technology).
146. See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 221–22 (2014) (concluding
that applying the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using a generic computer is
insufficient to meet the standards for eligibility).
147. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1303,
1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that the animation technology could not previously
perform the synchronizations seen in the instant claims); Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d at
715–16 (determining whether the claims generally describe a technological objective or
set forth a precise set of instructions for achieving the technological objective).
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improvements in computer functionality.148 In particular, the improved
database in Enfish amounted to an improvement to technology that mitigated
larger memory requirements.149 Similarly, the improved method of digital
data compression in DDR Holdings amounted to an improvement in
technology that allowed dual-source hybrid web pages.150 In sum, the
particular solution may be improved computer functionality superseding that
which was previously known in the art.
The “particular” portion of the particular solution comes from a
“harnessing” test such that the invention sets forth precise instructions for
achieving the technological objective.151 Ultramercial establishes that the
general-description-versus-precise-instructions generates a categorizing
effect such that inventions may pose improvements to technology or
technological fields depending on the outcome.152
Similarly, Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.153 highlights the
dangers of monopolizing technology by declaring patent eligibility for
inventions that generally describe technological objectives, and thus, fail to
set forth precise instructions for achieving the objective.154 As such,
applicants see an unavoidable catch-22 in seeking more protection with
broad claim language and purporting eligibility with narrowed claim
language such that claims are not rendered abstract for merely describing

148. See, e.g., Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(finding an improvement to computer functionality rather than mere economic or
business improvements for which a computer is used in its conventional capacity); DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1258–59, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(finding that the claims recited a specific way to automate webpage creation by an outside
party and include elements from various sources, thus resolving a particular internetbased problem).
149. Enfish, LLC, 822 F.3d at 1339 (finding a specific implementation of a solution
in software arts).
150. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258–59, 1265.
151. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 573 U.S. at 216 (disclosing that while natural laws,
scientific principles, and abstract ideas underly all of innovation, such judicial exceptions
must be harnessed such that they are used to solve seemingly intractable problems); see
also McRO, Inc., 837 F.3d at 1309 (finding that the abstract idea was harnessed in the
animation field in a particular manner such that an unknown benefit to the field was
asserted in the claims); Citrix Sys., Inc. v. Avi Networks, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 3d 511, 522
(D. Del. 2019) (contending that a claim is not directed to an improvement if the
technological benefit solely arises from an abstract idea applied to a well-understood
structure).
152. Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d at 715 (finding precise limitations for improved user
interfaces).
153. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
154. Id. at 13031.
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objectives.155 Therefore, the claims must at least add specific disclosures
when addressing a technological challenge in aiming for eligibility via
improvements to technology.156 Moreover, case law demonstrates that
improvements to technology may not be identified if the entirety of the
improvements is only reflected in the specification. 157 The owner is granted
protection over the claim language, and thus, the claim must embody the
improvement. The claims need not recite the improvements verbatim.158
However, the claim must cover such considerations in light of the
specification.159
The “harnessing test” establishes that there must be a concrete application
of technological solutions to technological problems.160 While abstract
concepts such as scientific principles (e.g., laws of gravity) are a baseline for
innovation, any determined inventive concept must harness the technological

155. See Voip-Pal.Com, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1145 (N.D. Cal.
2019) (invalidating a patent because the claims failed to reflect the asserted
improvements disclosed in the specification).
156. Compare IBM Corp. v. Groupon, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 596, 605 (D. Del. 2017)
(contending that the claims reflected specificities for the specific architecture behind the
claimed computer improvement by reciting how the screen display is generated), and
McRO, Inc., 837 F.3d at 1314 (explaining that the challenged claims had the specificity
required to transform a claim from one claiming only a result to one claiming a way of
achieving it), with Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d
1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that the claims did not require anything other than
conventional computing and network components acting in ordinary manners despite
arguments for disclosed benefits), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 378 (2018), and Internet
Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (invalidating
patents for failing to disclose specificity in the abstract idea used in addressing a
technological challenge).
157. See, e.g., McRO, Inc., 837 F.3d at 1316 (finding that the claims encompassed the
disclosed benefits of the specification).
158. See American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property Law, Comment
Letter on PTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (Mar. 7, 2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/eligibility2019comments_a_abaipl
_2019mar07.pdf (contending that the 2019 PEG does not appear to require that
improvements be explicitly recited in the claim language).
159. See Openwave Sys., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 808 F.3d 509, 514 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(discussing the importance of the specification in determining claim scope); see also
TNS Media Research, LLC v. Tivo Research & Analytics, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 3d 432,
450 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (concluding that the claims must reflect any disclosed benefits but
need not recite the benefits of the written description verbatim), vacated, 223 F. Supp.
3d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
160. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 219–21 (2014)
(stating that the invention must harness scientific laws and principles to solve problems);
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 98–99 (1939)
(suggesting that abstract principles must pose concrete applications).
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field in a specific manner.161 In Bascom, the inventive concept of installing
— at a specific, remote location — a filtering tool having customizable
features for internet users harnessed a technological feature of network
technology in a filtering system.162 Thus, there was a concrete application
of internet filtering on generic components in the specific arrangement of
technology such that the system allowed increased flexibility and decreased
susceptibility to hacking.163
b. 2019 PEG Versus Case Law
The determinations regarding improvement to technology appear
stretched across Step 2A Prong 2 and Step 2B.164 Under the 2019 PEG,
patent examiners are currently instructed to determine whether an
improvement to technology exists under Step 2A Prong 2.165 However, the
well-understood, routine, and conventional considerations that are evidence
as to whether there is an improvement to technology are notably left in Step
2B of the 2019 PEG, thus following the Step 2A Prong 2 determination of
whether an improvement to technology exists.166 Therefore, Step 2B is not
only redundant under the 2019 PEG, but it further creates a discrepancy in
current examination procedures.167 This discrepancy creates a divide in
eligibility decisions between federal courts and the PTO. While examiners
at the PTO must make determinations of improvement without
considerations of conventionality, federal courts hinge decisions for
improvements to technology on whether technological tools are merely
161. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 721–22 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(Mayer, J., concurring) (explaining the need to use judicial exceptions in accomplishing
technological objectives); see, e.g., Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility
LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (distinguishing between claims of an
abstract-based solution using generic components and a practical application of an
abstract concept).
162. Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1349–50 (finding that the
invention overcame the abstract idea).
163. Id. at 1350.
164. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,
53–56 (Jan. 7, 2019) (instructing the examiner to evaluate in Step 2A Prong 2 whether
the claim improves technology, yet prohibiting the examiner from evaluating whether
claim elements are conventional until Step 2B).
165. Id. at 53–56 (instructing examiners to determine whether a practical application
exists).
166. Id. (instructing examiners to determine whether inventive concept exists).
167. See John P. Kong, Key Practical Effects From the 2019 PEG, WESTERMAN
HATTORI DANIELS & ADRIAN LLP (Jan. 2019), http://www.whda.com/whda/assets/
dynapsis/Key-Practical-Effects-From-2019-PEG-John_Kong.pdf
(discussing
the
“conventional” considerations previously used in examination for improvements).
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performing conventional activity.168
i. Spotting Improvements
Determining improvements to technology is arguably subjective due to
claim comparisons between pending claims and those set forth in
guidance.169 Improvements to computer functionality generate benefits to
the way the computer works and are more objectively classified as
improvements rooted in the computing field.170 As examiners and courts are
directed to precedent to determine whether improvements exist, merging
considerations of improvements to computer functionality and technology
may decrease subjectivity.171 Improvements to technology could also be
evident in finding improvements to computer functionality. For example,
the improved database in Enfish led to increased flexibility and smaller
memory requirements in a computer.172 Additionally, the improved data
compression techniques in DDR Holdings led to the dual-source hybrid
webpage capability of the computer.173 Therefore, improvements to
computer functionality are likely results of improvements to technology.
While this practice may aid the identification of improvements to
technology, conflicting standards are brought to light under PTO standards
since examiners are unable to consider conventionality of computing
activities as seen in federal court considerations.174
ii. The Woes of the 2019 PEG
Examiners are not permitted to evaluate “conventional” versus
“unconventional” activity when determining improvements to technology
168. See, e.g., Alarm.com Inc. v. ipDatatel, LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 719, 728 (S.D. Tex.
2019) (stating that the court may find that the patent satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 101 if it is
“clear that the specific improvements in the recited computer technology go beyond
‘well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’”).
169. See, e.g., MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 24, Jan. 2018) § 2106 (highlighting federal case
law as a means for comparison to pending claims).
170. Id.; Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341,
1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
171. See MPEP (9th ed. Rev. 24, Jan. 2018) § 2106 (showing that examiners are to
either directly or indirectly follow federal precedent); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating that the courts must look to federal
precedent in eligibility decisions).
172. Enfish, LLC, 822 F.3d at 1335.
173. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
174. See Kong, supra note 167 (discussing the divide in court decisions and examiner
decisions under the 2019 PEG’s removal of the conventionality consideration from
improvement determinations).
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and are left with considerations of: (1) technological arts; (2) technological
problems necessitating technological solutions; and (3) particular disclosure
of benefits discussed in the specification and embodied in the claims.
Determinations of whether claim elements pose conventional activity are
notably left out of the evaluation for improvements to technology under the
2019 PEG.175 However, the 2019 PEG references cases such as Core
Wireless, DDR Holdings, and Finjan, which consider the conventional
analysis when determining improvements to technology.176 Moreover, the
2019 PEG instructs examiners to consult the MPEP, which highlights several
cases including considerations of conventional versus unconventional
activity.177 As such, there not only exists a discrepancy between Alice/Mayo
and the 2019 PEG, but within the 2019 PEG itself.
The examiner must determine under Step 2A Prong 2 whether the claim
poses, inter alia, an improvement to technology, or conversely: (1)
insignificant extra-solution activity; (2) general linking to a technological
field; or (3) mere instructions to apply a judicial exception.178 However, the
determinations for extra-solution activity, general linking, and mere
instructions to apply the judicial exception necessitate evaluations of wellunderstood, routine, and conventional activity.179 Under Alice/Mayo, the
examiner must determine whether a generic element performs wellunderstood, routine, or conventional activity to assess whether a claim
qualifies for a potential improvement to technology.180 Alternatively, the
175. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,
55 (Jan. 7, 2019) (stating that the well-understood, routine, and conventional
considerations are not evaluated in Step 2A Prong 2).
176. See id. at 7 n.25 (citing Core Wireless, DDR Holdings, and Finjan in the context
of the “improvement to other technology or technological field” portion of the 2019
PEG); e.g., DDR Holdings, LLC, 773 F.3d at 1257 (finding that the claims posed a
solution to problems seen in conventional systems).
177. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53
(discussing Enfish with respect to concrete improvements); see Enfish, LLC, 822 F.3d at
1337 (opining that the self-referential database functioned differently than conventional
database structures).
178. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56
(finding that a claim fails the eligibility test if the claim elements merely add insignificant
extra-solution activity, generally link the judicial exception to a technological field, or
amount to mere instructions to apply the judicial exception).
179. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 82
(2012) (explaining that conventional post-solution activity does not amount to patentable
subject matter).
180. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 225–26 (2014)
(highlighting that claims involving a computer that fail to show differences from any
other computer do not constitute significantly more than the abstract idea and generally
link the abstract idea to the computer).
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claim does not amount to an improvement to technology when generic claim
elements performed, for example, insignificant extra-solution activity. It is
unclear how the examiner can determine under Step 2A Prong 2 whether
alleged generic elements are performing without evaluating whether the
element is acting in a well-understood, routine, and conventional manner.181
The terms “generic” and “well-understood, routine, and conventional” are
not to be intertwined. “Generic” refers to an element itself and “wellunderstood, routine, and conventional” refers to the element’s activity. For
example, in Bascom, the court suggested that a generic computer’s
implementation referenced the component’s activity in determining whether
the invention posed an improvement.182
iii. Much Ado About Case Law
The discrepancy between the improvement determinations of the district
courts in TNS Media Research began with the “directed to” inquiry under the
Alice/Mayo test.183 Following these determinations, the courts disagreed
about whether there was a technological solution to a technological
problem.184 The vacating court, in finding such improvements, considered
the claim language for patent-validity.185 In sum, the TNS Media Research
181. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56
(instructing the examiner to consider whether the elements are performing insignificant
extra-solution activity, are generally linking the judicial exception to a field of use, or
are providing instructions to apply the judicial exception to a technology).
182. Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (differentiating between a technology-based solution and an abstractidea-based solution implemented in a conventional way on a generic computer).
183. Compare TNS Media Research LLC v. Tivo Research & Analytics, Inc., 166 F.
Supp. 3d 432, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that the claim was directed toward the
abstract concept of double-blind matching), with TNS Media Research LLC v. Tivo
Research & Analytics, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 3d 168, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (disagreeing with
the previous court’s double-blind matching determination and finding that the claims
were directed at the concrete idea of data mining for diversified entities).
184. See TNS Media Research LLC, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 181 (highlighting the need for
a change from conventional activity to purport an improvement before rendering the
claims an improvement to technology); Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs.,
Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (contending that claims which intend to
improve the functioning of a computer may be eligible if the improvement consists of
elements operating in an unconventional manner). Compare TNS Media Research LLC,
166 F. Supp. 3d at 448 (finding that the claims merely implemented a double-matching
technique), with TNS Media Research LLC, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 181 (stating that the digital
environment poses problems in obtaining data wherein the data, if captured, would pose
enormous informative benefits).
185. See TNS Media Research LLC, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 181 (contending that the claims
pose limited, concrete steps).
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court determined that there existed a particular technological solution to a
particular technological problem such that the invention could only be
implemented on a computer. 186 The TNS Media Research court found that
the invention offered a precise set of instructions to collect, store, analyze,
and cleanse data.187
District courts in the Northern District of California further disagree on
what subject matter qualifies for conventional activity versus unconventional
activity that effects an improvement on technology.188 The District Court in
Fitbit found that a method for detecting and recording the physical activity
of a person was directed to an abstract idea of collecting and reporting
data.189 The court found that the challenged claims did not purport to effect
an improvement in technology because any alleged benefits to the field of
portable activity monitoring fail to amount to improvements in the portable
activity device’s capabilities.190 The challenged claims are distinguishable
from the method claims of McRO, which improved computer animation, and
the Enfish claims, which improved database technology.191
This distinction further arises from the existence of an unconventional
change to a technological component seen in Enfish and McRO.192 In light
of TNS Media Research, the Immersion court incorrectly asserted that the
Fitbit claims were ineligible due to the statutory class.193 Further, the
186. See id. (stating that the claims disclosed concrete steps rather than high-level
abstractions).
187. Id. at 182.
188. See Immersion Corp. v. Fitbit, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1025–26 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (suggesting that the court’s determination in Fitbit, Inc. v. AliphCom, No. 16-cv00118-BLF, 2017 WL 819235, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2017), is incorrect in light of
findings of unconventional changes to technology in Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United
States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
189. Fitbit, 2017 WL 819235, at *10 (stating that presenting results is nothing more
than a mental process and can be done with a pencil and paper).
190. See id. (distinguishing the alleged benefits with improvements seen in Enfish and
McRO).
191. See id. at **10, 15 (noting that Enfish and McRO claim subject matter that
requires an improvement to technology (i.e., a tool) used in a technological field, and not
just an incidental benefit to a technological field).
192. Compare id. at *12 (delineating that the structure of a wearable band with a
motion detection component and LEDs did not pose unconventional changes to a tool in
a technological field), with Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (clarifying that the self-referential database functioned differently than
conventional database structures), and McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc.,
837 F.3d 1299, 1302–03 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that the claims incorporated
unconventional rules relating sub-sequences of phenomes, timing, and morph weight sets
to solve a problem in conventional industry practice).
193. See Immersion Corp., 313 F. Supp. 3d at 1025–26 (suggesting that the Fitbit
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Immersion court’s suggestion that the Fitbit claims may be eligible under
Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States is incorrect in light of the
unconventional arrangement of sensors seen in Thales not similarly seen in
the wearable band of Fitbit.194 Immersion thus demonstrates the conflicting
standards of eligibility in the federal court system, thereby highlighting the
need for congressional action.
c. The End of the Patent System as We Know It
Although the 2019 PEG purports to reduce subjectivity in the patent
process, the patent community has found increased unpredictability in the
application of the 2019 PEG.195 Moreover, the Federal Circuit has failed to
mitigate such disarray, thereby highlighting the need for congressional
action.196 If the federal courts are making determinations of patentability
under Alice/Mayo, the PTO is making determinations under the 2019 PEG,
and the Patent Trial and Appeals Board uses both tests, applicants are likely
faced with difficulty in establishing sufficient evidence for the record in
prosecuting and defending patents.197 In particular, applicants must decide
which guidelines suffice for the record to support prosecution at the PTO and
defense at the federal court level. The 2019 PEG provides a lower bar for
findings of eligibility than the Alice/Mayo test, and thus, applicants may be

claims were ineligible for claiming a method rather than a device). But see TNS Media
Research, LLC v. Tivo Research & Analytics, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 3d 168, 181 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (finding that the claimed method was not directed to an abstract idea).
194. See Immersion Corp., 313 F. Supp. 3d at 1025 n.4 (suggesting that the Fitbit
claims may be directed toward a particular, useful configuration of components).
Compare Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(finding that the unconventional utilization of inertial sensors results mitigates errors in
conventional systems), with Fitbit, 2017 WL 819235, at *12 (finding no nonconventional arrangement of LEDs on the band and that each LED performs a
conventional function).
195. See Bryan McWhorter & Russell Jeide, 2019 Eligibility Guidance Leads to
Unpredictable Results at the PTAB, KNOBBE MARTENS (Feb. 15, 2019, 12:00 PM),
https://www.knobbe.com/news/2019/02/2019-eligibility-guidance-leads-unpredictableresults-ptab (explaining the Patent Trial & Appeals Board has, in some instances,
adopted the guidance as controlling and, in other instances, mentioned the guidance in
passing while ruling under the Alice/Mayo test).
196. See Gene Quinn, It May Be Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit, IP WATCHDOG
(July 9, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/07/09/may-time-abolish-federalcircuit/id=111122/ (discussing the Federal Circuit’s failure in policing the
unpredictability of regional courts and in attempting to spur innovation through strong
patents).
197. See Gvoth, supra note 20 (highlighting the ongoing uncertainty in applying 35
U.S.C. § 101 by the PTO and Federal Circuit).
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confronted with inconsistent decisions in light of such unpredictability.198
The University of Florida recently faced conflicts in eligibility standards
when the Federal Circuit invalidated claims that are similar to those seen in
the PTO examples set forth under the 2019 PEG.199 Here, the claims were
directed toward a bedside device that converted data streams from bedside
machines regardless of the originating format.200 This claim appears to
match Example 42 of the 2019 PEG, which recites an improvement to
technology in claiming conversions of non-standardized formats of data
from various sources to standardized formats.201 While the claims are
admittedly not identical, applicants must cover multiple bases in discussing
both tests for eligibility, thereby overflowing the record, to ensure that there
is sufficient protection for impending challenges.202
Frustrations among applicants vanquish the patent system as currently
set.203 In particular, applicants likely will take inventions overseas in search
of more predictable standards, rather than seeking patent protection in the
United States.204 Business competition in the United States may fall as China
and other competing countries will be at a greater advantage to collect
198. See Daniel Rose, Federal Circuit’s Decision in University of Florida Research
Foundation v. General Electric Raises Questions with Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP:
IP LITIG. CURRENT (Mar. 4, 2019),
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2019/03/federal-circuits-decision-inuniversity-of-florida (discussing the discrepancy between the invalidation decision of
University of Florida Research Foundation v. General Electric and Example 42 of the
2019 PEG).
199. See Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. GE, 916 F.3d 1363, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir.
2019) (invalidating claims disclosing conversions from received data streams to an
independent format to integrate data from bedside machines). But see U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 56, at 17–19 (concluding that claims for conversions
from non-standardized to standardized formats recited an improvement over prior art
systems by allowing the real-time sharing of information in a standardized format
independent of an original format).
200. Univ. of Fla. Research Found., 916 F.3d at 1368.
201. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 56, at 17–19.
202. See DeCarlo & Zalepa, supra note 114 (instructing applicants to anticipate a
multitude of challenges under various standards).
203. See Meredith Addy, Confessions of a Frustrated Patent Attorney: The
Telephone Call, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/
10/01/confessions-frustrated-patent-attorney-telephone-call/id=88636/ (discussing the
growing frustration of patent seekers due to expense and unpredictability of the patent
system).
204. Eileen McDermott, Judge Paul Michel: Look to Congress, Not Courts, to Fix
the U.S. Patent System, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2019/04/04/judge-paul-michel-look-congress-not-courts-fix-u-s-patent-system/id=
107948/ (contending that various problems in the U.S. patent system incentivize
inventors to take investments overseas).
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innovators seeking fair protection.205 Patents directly correlate with a
thriving economy, and the United States will see a resultant dip in the
economy if applicants are unable to file.206
If applicants decide to keep innovation in the United States, innovation
will likely be encompassed in the hands of the few under the guise of
promising protection in the world of trade secrets.207 Any imbalance in
categories of protection will affect the respective systems.208 Vitiating the
trade secret laws would likely lead to trivial filings in the PTO, and similarly,
the end of the PTO would lead to increased action under trade secrets.209
However, decreased filings at the PTO could also affect the public domain.210
The patent system strikes a bargain between public disclosure of scientific
improvements and termed protection for the owner.211 Trade secrets may
offer indefinite protection without necessitating disclosure.212 As such,
business method patent seekers may privatize inventions of processes,
thereby hindering the patent system and decreasing public access to
innovation.213
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD DEFINE ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER AND
IMPROVEMENTS TO TECHNOLOGY OR TECHNOLOGICAL FIELDS
Tensions between abstract ideas and the eligibility of business method
patents stress the need for Congress to define what subject matter constitutes
an abstract idea and to specify standards within that definition.214 Congress
205. See id. (suggesting that China will dominate the market if there are no resolutions
to the patent system).
206. Id.
207. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S 470, 483, 487–88 (1974)
(highlighting the overlap between patents and trade secrets for processes).
208. Id. at 485 (suggesting that the PTO would be overburdened with patent
applications if seekers of trade secrets applied for patents).
209. Id. (arguing that trade secrets are directed to ineligible material and would be
doomed to be rejected at the PTO).
210. See Paul Michel & John Battaglia, It Is Time to Fix the Courts’ Section 101 Tests
on ‘Directed to . . .’ and ‘Abstract Ideas’—Whether in Chamberlain or Beyond (Part I),
IP WATCHDOG (June 9, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/06/09/time-fixcourts-section-101-tests-directed-abstract-ideas-whether-chamberlain-beyondpart/id=122302/ (highlighting the bargain of a limited protection in exchange for the
disclosure of innovations).
211. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 490–91.
212. Id.
213. See Michel & Battaglia, supra note 210 (stressing that the current state of patent
eligibility will undermine the innovation that the Patent Act purported to promote).
214. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(contending that the Federal Circuit must compare challenged claims to precedent since
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should amend 35 U.S.C. § 101 such that the “abstract idea” category under
the judicial exception is severely limited, thereby vitiating subjectivity.
The patent system was enacted to spur innovation in the economy, but now
discourages innovation in the most modern technologies due to its
inconsistencies and unpredictability.215
Businesses thrive on the
competitions to compile the most up-to-date technology into portfolios, and
big and small businesses alike will suffer if the patent field loses steam.
Businesses may look overseas in search of more consistent standards,
thereby taking innovation away from the public. The current tensions
between eligibility standards may drive the system to the extreme that 35
U.S.C. § 101 strove to prevent.
Congressional action would mitigate inconsistencies between the courts
and agencies. Instead of acting as a safety net for restricting patentability,
35 U.S.C. § 101 should provide more defined standards for when to reject an
invention that has a statutory class. Some members of the patent community
agree that 35 U.S.C. § 101 acts as a safety net to reduce the number of patents
that enter the market for the wrong reasons.216 In setting forth consistent
standards, Congress should adopt guidance similar to standards set forth in
the 2019 PEG under PTO Director Andrei Iancu’s mission to bring eligibility
in closer light with current technology.217 Not only would such practice
mitigate unpredictability, but the patent system would permit innovation
without fear of court invalidation. By bringing a member of the “outside” in
to direct the agency, all sides of the patent system have begun to collaborate
in striving to understand eligibility.218
the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to define “abstract idea”).
215. See John Dubiansky, Competition Advocacy and the Patent System: Promoting
Competitive Markets for Technology, 25 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 145, 159 (2019) (citing
FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 7 (2003)) (discussing the bargain between disclosing
inventions with the public and receiving protection for an invention for a set time frame
to provide incentives for innovation).
216. See Joe Mullin, Experts Warn Congress: Proposed Changes to Patent Law
Would Thwart Innovation, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 12, 2019), https://www.
eff.org/deeplinks/2019/06/it-should-be-clear-now-messing-patent-laws-section-101bad-idea (warning the Senate that 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a powerful tool in rejecting patent
applications that should not be protected, thereby allowing small businesses room to
innovate). But see Andrei Iancu, The Current State of Innovation within the U.S. Legal
System — Views on Evolving Protection for Intellectual Property Rights in the United
States from the USPTO and the Courts, 101 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11, 17–
18 (2019) (stating that eligibility must align with the current state of technology such that
there are fewer rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
217. Iancu, supra note 216, at 13.
218. See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, The Benefits of Capture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
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Congress should implement a revised standard for eligibility based on the
improvement standard set forth herein and the 2019 PEG. Additionally,
Congressional action should include clarifications to the improvement to
technology standard. If Congress adopts the 2019 PEG, the technology
standard should be clarified for compatibility with case law precedent.
V. CONCLUSION
Monopolization of judicial exceptions could impede rather than promote
innovation, “thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws.”219
However, if patent eligibility is too restrictive, such unforgiving restrictions
could result in the impediment of innovation. Bringing eligibility standards
in line with current states of technological innovation is the best option for
saving the patent system and for continuing to promote business growth. The
2019 PEG, in purporting to streamline examination procedures, is actually
increasing eligibility rates over what is seen in the federal courts under the
Alice/Mayo test. The differing requirements create a discrepancy in
eligibility determinations between the agency and the courts. The Patent
Trial and Appeals Board is currently caught between a rock and a hard place
because it must choose which test to apply. This election of which test to
apply results in randomized outcomes. The patent system may become
stifled as applicants are restricted in the subject matter they believe they can
patent. For this reason, Congress must step in to clearly define what subject
matter may constitute an eligible patent, and clarify the precedent for
improvements to technology or technological fields.

569, 573 (2012) (arguing that “capture” allows collaboration and offers benefits to
agencies and the public).
219. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).

